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I. INTRODUCTION

In an effort to protect the national economy from the economic burden created by
the expanding cost of healthcare, Congress enacted legislation under the Commerce
Clause1 to compel or mandate specific people to engage in the economic activity of
purchasing health insurance.2 On June 28, 2012, four months after the primary focus
of my Article was written, the Supreme Court held in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius3 that the federal mandate to buy private health
insurance in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is an
unconstitutional exercise of the power of Congress to regulate Commerce. The
individual mandate violates the Commerce Clause because it does not regulate
existing commercial activity.4 The mandate compels individuals to become active in
commerce by buying a product, on the basis that their failure to do so affects
*
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University of Mississippi. I would like to thank my Research Assistant, Brenda Dang, J.D.
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1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

2

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

3

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).

4

Id. at 2587.
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interstate commerce.5 Interpreting the Commerce Clause to allow Congress to
regulate individuals specifically because they are doing nothing would release a new
and potentially unlimited domain to congressional authority. 6
PPACA’s compulsion that particular individuals pay a financial penalty for not
acquiring health insurance may reasonably be described as a tax. 7 Since the
Constitution authorizes such a tax, it is not the role of the Supreme Court to forbid it,
or to decide its wisdom or fairness.8 Because the Federal Government does not have
the power to command people to buy health insurance under the Commerce Clause,
Section 5000A’s individual mandate is not a valid exercise of the Commerce Power
by Congress. However, Congress does have the power to impose a tax on those
without health insurance and, therefore, the individual mandate is a valid and
constitutional exercise of the power of Congress under the Taxing Clause. 9
The Obama administration contends the individual mandate is “absolutely
intertwined” with PPACA provisions prohibiting insurers from rejecting applicants
as well as prohibiting insurers from taking into account an applicant’s pre-existing
conditions.10 The fundamental focus of this Article is whether the decision not to buy
individual health insurance as required by Congress also qualifies as valid economic
activity under the Commerce Clause. This question before the Court continues the
modern battle regarding the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause,
and the battle regarding the regulation of economic activity continues, irrespective of
the Supreme Court decision regarding PPACA, because of the continuing impact of
the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Lopez.11
In Lopez, the Court held that because a Gun Free School Zone Law went beyond
the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, it was
unconstitutional.12 In a dissenting opinion in Lopez, Justice Souter correctly warned
that it would be a serious mistake to think of the Supreme Court’s holding as an
insignificant event in Commerce Clause law. 13 Justice Souter appropriately
articulated a position saying that the holding in Lopez could be the foundation for a
substantial rollback of the commerce power that could endanger a world of federal
commerce power, which his generation had continuously experienced. 14 However,
Professor Richard Primus argues that the day of the big commerce clause rollback
has not come.15 From both a doctrinal and political perspective, all the drama
5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id. at 2600.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 2601.

10

Id.

11

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

12

See id.

13

Richard Primus, How the Gun-Free School Zones Act Saved the Individual Mandate,
110 MICH. L. Rev. 44, 50-51 (2012).
14

Id. at 51.

15

Id.
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regarding the Supreme Court’s applicability of the Commerce Clause to PPACA is
about whether now is the right time for the federal judiciary to rollback the
commerce clause power of Congress. 16
The fact that the Supreme Court initially scheduled five and a half hours of oral
arguments in place of the standard one-hour is evidence of the significance of
PPACA case, and the Court’s judgment, only a few months afterwards, offered
many insights and challenges to the presidential contenders and candidates in the
fight for power in Congress.17 The Obama White House, which requested the
Supreme Court to review the case immediately as opposed to later, contended that
the challenges to the PPACA and its individual mandates are similar to those that
confronted Social Security, the Civil Rights Act, and other very important parts of
progressive social legislation.18 The Supreme Court then announced on December
19, 2011 that it scheduled three days in March of 2012 to consider arguments that
challenged the constitutionality of PPACA.19
On March 26, 2012, the Court proceeded by listening to arguments involving the
issue of whether the federal Anti-Injunction Act creates a situation where a court
dispute regarding the individual mandate, like the one within PPACA, is an untimely
challenge if brought prior to 2015.20 The court scheduled two hours on March 27,
2012 to hear arguments on the most important issue in the litigation –whether
Congress went beyond its constitutional authority by compelling most Americans
under PPACA’s individual mandate to buy health insurance or opt out of buying
health insurance and be assessed a fee. 21 The Court scheduled arguments involving
two issues for March 28, 2012.22 Initially, the Court contemplated for ninety minutes
whether PPACA’s individual mandate can be segregated from the rest of PPACA.23
Next, the Court scheduled an hour of argument on March 28, 2012 to determine
whether Congress may enlarge the size and range of Medicaid.24 The dominant and
most plausible explanation for the Supreme Court granting five and one-half hours
for three consecutive days in March 2012 for oral arguments regarding the
constitutionality of the PPACA is because the Court is seriously considering how to
justify a rollback of enumerated commerce power of Congress on an issue of market
place social justice.
16

Id. at 44.

17

See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/us/supreme-court-to-hear-casechallenging-health-law.html?pagewanted=all.
18
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Obama’s Health-Care Overhaul,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-hearchallenge-to-obamas-health-care-overhaul/2011/11/11/gIQALTvrKN_story.html.
19

Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Health Care Case in Late March, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2011, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/supreme-court-to-hear-healthcare-case-in-late-march/?nl=us&emc=politicsemailema4.
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

32

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:29

PPACA requires an individual, under specific circumstances, to either purchase
health insurance or make a payment for a failure to acquire health insurance. 25
Professor Mark Hall contends the more convincing arguments in the individual
mandate battle support the conclusion that a congressional directive that encourages
individuals to obtain healthcare insurance is a permissible regulation of Congress’s
commerce power under the Commerce Clause.26 The Commerce Clause allows
Congress to regulate the economic marketplace involving the commercial enterprise
of healthcare insurance coverage or healthcare services. 27 In U.S. v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, the Supreme Court articulated that “[n]o commercial
enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to
be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.” 28 The interstate market
for individual healthcare coverage without an individual mandate, and regulated
under state and local laws, creates an undue burden on the national economy. 29
Therefore, an individual’s decision not to purchase healthcare coverage through an
insurance policy should be treated as a commercial enterprise. 30
Congress may utilize its historical regulatory power under the Commerce Clause
to eradicate the undue burden on the national economy created by requiring all
American’s to purchase healthcare insurance that contains an individual mandate. 31
The requirement to purchase healthcare insurance coverage or to pay a fee to the
government helps to control costs of healthcare in the interstate market by increasing
the pool of healthy, insured individuals.32 The Supreme Court’s duty when it applied
the Commerce Clause to PPACA was to keep the power to regulate interstate
commercial risks among the states in the hands of Congress, because the power to
regulate interstate commercial risks “is vested in the Congress, available to be
exercised for the national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary.” 33 For one to
refuse to purchase healthcare insurance is in reality a commercial venture because
that individual’s decision cannot be separated from an aggregate burden on the
national healthcare service market.34 Under the rationale of United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association, Congress may use its Commerce Clause power to
25

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242
(2010).
26

See Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1825, 1828 (2011).
27
See generally, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944) (holding Congress may utilize its power under the commerce clause to regulate the
insurance industry).
28

Id. at 553.

29

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242
(2010).
30

Id. at 242-43.

31

See id. at 244.

32

See id. at 243.

33

Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 552-53.

34

See id. at 552.
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regulate the healthcare insurance market, and therefore promoting national welfare in
healthcare services by making healthcare more affordable under PPACA.35
The collective impact of the refusal to purchase health insurance in the healthcare
market creates an undue burden on the national economy. 36 Since 1824, the Supreme
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden understood the regulatory nature of the Commerce
Clause power vested by the Constitution to Congress, giving Congress the power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed for the purpose of protecting
our national economy.37 Because the individual health insurance mandate
requirement is a plausible means of protecting our national economy, the regulatory
power of the Commerce Clause allows Congress to prescribe the rules by which
healthcare service is to be paid for by individuals. 38 A reasonable interpretation of
the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in United States v. Darby39 strongly
suggests that the individual healthcare mandate issue presented under PPACA is
neither original nor fresh.40 In Darby, the Supreme Court again articulated its
historically correct view that the Commerce Clause granted Congress complete
power to regulate conditions involving interstate transportation and other situations
that place an unnecessary burden on the national economy. 41 Under this power,
Congress has the authority to protect items involved in interstate commerce from
unfair economic competition by expressly regulating the wages and hours paid to
employees.42
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is so extensive that it is only
limited by the Constitution itself. 43 One group of commentators challenges the lower
courts’ conclusion in both Virginia and Florida that PPACA’s individual mandate
requirement exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. 44 The Virginia
and Florida lower courts (1) failed to adequately identify the “market” that Congress
intended to impact, (2) did not understand the expansive public health policy
objectives generated by PPACA, and (3) created unnecessary uncertainty regarding
Congress’s authority to act in the best interest of an individual involving public
health issues.45 Additionally, Professor Randy E. Barnett contends PPACA’s
individual responsibility requirement is unconstitutional because Congress cannot
35

See id. at 552-53.

36

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 242-44
(2010).
37

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 96 (1824).

38

Id.

39

See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

40

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
41

Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.

42

Id.

43

Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 75.

44

James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Congress, Courts, and Commerce: Upholding the Individual
Mandate to Protect the Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED & ETHICS 394, 398 (2011).
45

Id.
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exercise its power over interstate commerce, even when attached to the Necessary
and Proper Clause requiring people to undertake the economic activity of buying
health insurance from a private business or paying a fee for failure to do so. 46 A
decision to buy health insurance or not to buy health insurance is by its very nature
an intellectual economic activity. However, under the individual mandate provision
of PPACA,47 Congress makes available a forum for economic activity by presenting
a person with an opportunity to make an economic decision about whether to
purchase healthcare insurance.48
In one case challenging the individual mandate provision of PPACA, a federal
court in Michigan accepted the government’s argument that the provision “regulates
economic decisions regarding the way in which healthcare services are paid for.” 49
Since an economic decision to buy or not to buy healthcare insurance requires
intellectual activity regarding the healthcare market, the argument that no activity
has taken place when an individual does not buy healthcare insurance should be
rejected.50 The assertion that a court is required to engage in a highly abstract line of
reasoning to support the conclusion that the economic decision not to purchase
insurance is a definite intellectual economic activity is not valid. 51 Intellectual
activity involving the decision to buy or not to buy healthcare insurance is an
example of an economic decision, which the Commerce Clause allows Congress to
regulate under PPACA.52
The major goal of PPACA is to decrease the number of Americans without
healthcare insurance and the growing economic price tag they inflict on the
healthcare system when not covered.53 Since the prevailing purpose of PPACA’s
individual mandate54 is to decrease the burden on the national healthcare marketplace
and national economy from the millions of uninsured Americans, PPACA is a valid
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.55 Under the Commerce Clause,
Congress has the ability to regulate those activities of the uninsured that substantially
affect the interstate healthcare marketplace.56 Congress’s legislative intent to bring
down the cost of health insurance, increase coverage, and trim down uncompensated
care will be unworkable if the minimum coverage prerequisite, which commands all

46
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 606 (2010).
47
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
48

Id.

49

Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D.Mich. 2010).

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 894.

53

Id. at 893.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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United States citizens, not specifically exempt to keep “minimum essential
coverage” healthcare, is not permitted to commence in 2014. 57
Congress established that the individual mandate is a necessary component of a
much larger regulation of economic activity and that its nonexistence would chip
away at federal regulation of the health insurance market.58 The rationale of
Gonzalez v. Raich59 establishes that the individual mandate requirement is a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause power by Congress. There are many good reasons
for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power to reduce the economic
burdens created in the healthcare marketplace; particularly, the millions of uninsured
Americans who increase the cost of healthcare services for all. 60 PPACA’s individual
mandate requirement should be regarded as a constitutionally permissible attempt to
eliminate the undue burden on interstate healthcare created by uninsured
Americans.61 Although a person’s activity may only consists of one’s economic
decision not to purchase healthcare insurance, it still may be regulated by Congress
if such a decision exerts a substantial economic impact on the interstate health
insurance market.62
Part II of this Article contends that the decision not to purchase health insurance
is not to be treated as an economic activity because it is not connected to economic
risk-taking should be rejected outright as nothing more than a denial of the economic
reality at a practical interactive marketplace level. 63 Part III of this Article provides
an analysis of the individual mandate as a Commerce Clause issue, with a focus
particularly on a case from Florida, objecting to the 2010 healthcare overhaul law as
unconstitutional, which on November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court agreed to hear. 64
Three different courts had urged the Supreme Court to review the essential issue
concerning the power of Congress to invoke PPACA’s individual mandate.65 Since
the 11th Circuit was the only court to hold the individual mandate unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court may have been persuaded to hear the cases from that circuit.66
Part III discusses why the Supreme Court should have reversed the conclusion from
the District Court in Florida that the individual health insurance mandate is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

57

Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 886.

58

Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).

59

Id. at 32-33.

60

Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893.

61

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
62

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).

63

Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893.

64

Liptak, supra note 17.

65

Liptak, supra note 17.

66

Liptak, supra note 17.
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II. THE ARGUMENT THAT THE DECISION NOT TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE IS
NOT TO BE TREATED AS AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BECAUSE IT IS NOT CONNECTED
TO ECONOMIC RISK-TAKING SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A DENIAL OF ECONOMIC
REALITY AT THE PRACTICAL INTERACTIVE MARKETPLACE LEVEL
The thrust of the argument against the constitutional validity of PPACA is that
Congress lacks the authority under the Commerce Clause to require individuals to
purchase health insurance or subject them to a tax. 67 Twenty-seven state Attorneys
General argued that Congress could not, under the Commerce Clause, command
people to purchase health insurance because it is not connected or linked to
economic risk-taking.68 This argument should be rejected as a denial of economic
reality at the practical interactive marketplace level. 69 The decision to pay for
medical expenses either through health insurance or at the occurrence of an event
requiring medical care is, in fact, economic activity.70 Congress appropriately
concluded that the individual mandate was a necessary and essential component of
regulating economic activity for health insurance. Without PPACA’s individual
mandate, a person could destabilize the federal supervision of the health insurance
market by delaying the decision to pay for health insurance until she considered care
necessary.71 If an individual can delay her decision to purchase health insurance
without the economic burden of an increased premium expense when she is sick, this
will defeat PPACA’s goal of lowering the cost of health insurance premiums. 72 But
with the individual mandate, insurance companies can maintain lower premiums
with an increased pool of insureds, therefore, accomplishing PPACA’s goal. 73
Robert Peck correctly asserts that PPACA’s individual mandate is a practical
means of making insurance coverage economically feasible, as insurance companies
can no longer deny coverage based on an individual’s pre-existing health situation.74
PPACA requires health insurers to offer coverage without increased rates for
individuals with pre-existing health conditions.75 Because of this, Congress rationally
concluded that insurance companies would only remain economically profitable if
PPACA commanded virtually every American to pay for some form of health
insurance coverage.76 Only Americans unable to obtain insurance due to their

67

Hodge et al., supra note 44, at 394.

68

Hodge et al., supra note 44, at 394.

69

Thomas More Ctr., 720 F.Supp.2d at 893.

70

Id.

71

42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(A)(LexisNexis 2012).

72

§ 18091(2)(I).

73

Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139,
154 (2011).
74

Robert S. Peck, Understanding the Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Care
Reform, THE BRIEF, Summer 2011, at 28.
75

Id.

76

Id.
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financial situation are free from this obligation.77 Starting in 2014, Americans who
do not acquire the minimum health insurance will be charged a fee equivalent to the
larger of $95 or 1 percent of their income equal to the price of an essential health
insurance plan. This fee is to be subtracted from any tax refund owed to that
individual.78 By 2016, the involuntary coverage price of the insurance will rise to
$695 for each adult, or a total of 2.5 percent of income. 79
Allison K. Hoffman argues that PPACA’s individual mandate is designed to
allow the government to achieve universal coverage while avoiding any basic
reformation of the present payment and delivery systems. 80 Basically, PPACA will
not alter or transform the mainly private distribution of healthcare due to some
combination of public and private financing.81 The government's primary function
under PPACA is to serve as a vehicle for promoting universal coverage. 82 PPACA
establishes a structure that is similar to Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.
In those countries, each individual’s involvement in the country’s healthcare
insurance coverage is required and insurance is managed by private organizations
and financed from a combination of public and private funds. 83
However, because PPACA’s goal of achieving universal coverage is based on
actuarially-rated commercial insurance, to which its purpose is profit and not a
universal right to have access to health care, the universal healthcare goal will more
than likely be sacrificed in favor of profits.84 This contradiction presents enough
problems to keep the individual mandate requirement of PPACA from being utilized
as an effective tool for reaching a goal of universal coverage. 85 The basis of
considerable disagreement concerning the individual mandate under PPACA is
whether it will fail to achieve universal coverage. 86 The requirement under PPACA
to purchase health insurance has produced energetic discussions about the regulatory
reach of the Commerce Clause.87
PPACA’s passage created an array of political emotions.88 When PPACA was
enacted into law it was a very partisan event. 89 The Senate passed PPACA on
77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets,
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (2010).
81

Id. at 15-16.

82

Id. at 16.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Scott Lindstrom, Comment, Health Care Reform and Rural America: The Effect of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act On the Rural Economy and Rural Health, 47
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 644 (2011).
87

Elizabeth J. Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249 (2011).
88

Id.

38
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December 24, 2009, by a vote of 60-39, all Democrats and Independents voting to
support it and all Republicans voting to oppose it. 90 It was approved in the House of
Representatives on March 21, 2010, by a vote of 219-212, although 178 Republicans
and 34 Democrats did not support it.91 Almost immediately following PPACA’s
approval, extensive ligation was filed, testing PPACA’s constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause.92 Professor Wilson Huhn argued that PPACA’s individual
mandate might present a significant problem regarding the constitutionality of the
entire law.93 The goal of PPACA’s drafter’s was to expand access to healthcare by
greatly decreasing the total number of uninsured persons. 94 The Congressional
Budget Office and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services report the
PPACA will effectively make available health insurance coverage not previously
had to between 32 to 34 million additional American citizens.95 PPACA is designed
to manage the health insurance market in a manner to ensure specific minimum
insurance protection to individuals. 96 By expanding the number of insureds, the
constitutional validity of PPACA’s “individual mandate,” or Minimum Essential
Coverage Provision (MECP), is absolutely necessary if PPACA is to achieve the
Congressional goal of expanding access to healthcare insurance. 97
Despite the fact that PPACA’s individual mandate was responsible for a great
deal of the opposition in the Senate and House of Representatives to the legislation,
the section’s endorsers were determined to keep the individual mandate in the law
because it was viewed as the heart of the legislation, as a tool to regulate a
dysfunctional healthcare insurance market.98 Professor Nan Hunter correctly asserts
it would be economically infeasible in the healthcare insurance marketplace to
increase individuals’ access to healthcare coverage without using the individual
mandate as a tool to offset preexisting health condition discrimination. 99 The
practical effect of outlawing medical underwriting and discrimination because of
pre-existing health conditions is to make the insurance market more available to
individuals, regardless of each individual’s current health condition and increasing
coverage to those with the greatest need.100 However, commanding insurers to accept
high-risk beneficiaries at a reduced cost while not including a mandate that healthy
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 249-50.

92

Huhn, supra note 73, at 142.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 139.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Nan D. Hunter, Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1955, 1973 (2011).
99
100

Id.
Id. at 1975.
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persons enroll in insurance pools would destroy the private marketplace by
concurrently dropping premium income while raising payments. 101
Harold Pollack and Greg Anrig contend that President Obama could have
announced PPACA as his single most significant domestic accomplishment in his
2012 State of the Union address.102 PPACA without a doubt remains an extremely
contentious and divisive law with results and expenditures pending for many years
after its passage. The prevailing early evidence reveals that PPACA is currently
enhancing the lives of millions of Americans just a few years after its enactment.103
PPACA is encouraging as long-overdue basic changes in our dysfunctional
healthcare structure was necessary.104 Even though PPACA does not take full effect
until 2014, Harold Pollack and Greg Anrig have identified five tangible areas where
PPACA is already having an impact: (1) approximately 2.5 million additional young
adults are now insured as a result of the new law; (2) senior Americans have greater
prescription drug and preventive care coverage;(3) coverage is more accessible for
those individuals with pre-existing conditions; (4) structural transformations are
already building a more efficient healthcare procedure; and (5) the law encourages
fairness, transparency, and integrity in the private healthcare insurance
marketplace.105 Since PPACA transforms the essential business model of private
healthcare insurance, the insurance industry will be unable to profit by cherrypicking healthy customers or denying coverage to those individuals with preexisting
conditions.106 Because the federal government under PPACA teams up with states in
investigating insurance rate increases, some insurers have already amended or
reversed big rate increases.107
Although PPACA benefits millions of Americans, it is not an accident or
coincidence that the requirement that all individuals purchase qualifying health
coverage is the most controversial and contested aspect of the law by those opposed
to any health insurance reform. 108 The individual mandate is the primary focus of
constitutional dispute regarding PPACA because it is the instrument by which the
law accomplishes its goal of comprehensive and subsidized healthcare coverage. 109
The motivation for the individual mandate is easy to understand: it is the only
method to make young, healthy persons, who habitually and voluntarily forego
health insurance coverage, pay into the healthcare insurance structure in this manner,

101

Id.

102
Harold Pollack & Greg Anrig, The Quiet Triumph of Obama Care, WASH. MONTHLY
BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-milessquare/2012/01/a_quiet_triumph_of_obama_care035079.php.
103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia’s Response to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 37, 50 (2010).
109

Id. at 50-51.
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cross-subsidizing seniors and unhealthy individuals. 110 If the Supreme Court opined
that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and could not be upheld as a tax,
PPACA would have financially crippled. The individual mandate is absolutely
necessary for PPACA to effectively produce the results intended by Congress and
the drafters of the legislation. 111
Even though the Supreme Court has held the individual mandate in PPACA as
imposing a permissible tax, the federal government may find it difficult to collect the
penalties it imposes on violators.112 This difficulty exists because PPACA prohibits
the placing of liens or levies on a taxpayer’s property if the individual does not pay
the fee.113 The IRS may withhold an individuals tax refund if the individual fails to
produce evidence that she is insured; however, this measure is not effective for those
individuals not entitled to an adequate refund or any refund at all. 114 For people not
entitled to either an adequate tax refund or any tax refund, one commentator asserts
that submission to PPACA’s individual mandate is effectively voluntary. 115
A private health insurance company’s level of profit is directly linked to how the
insurance company is able to manage and redistribute its risks. 116 PPACA
significantly modifies how insurance companies may redistribute covered
individuals’ risks by regulating how those risks are distributed. 117 A risk class is
created as an economic tool for sharing risks or risk pooling. 118 Risk pooling is
expanded when the insurance coverage and prices are comparable for the insured in
a pool119 (e.g., in those situations where costs and coverage are not personalized
because of a person’s risk). 120 In the past, private health insurance was presented in
three markets: big group (over 50 or 100 employees, varied by state), little group,
and individual.121 All three markets made the redistribution of risks possible. 122 The
big group market traditionally distributed risks more comprehensively than the little
group or the individual market. 123 PPACA’s plain meaning and subject matter
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promptly champions the argument that the individual mandate’s goal clearly
includes regulation of insurers in the healthcare market. 124
Because PPACA views health insurance as a vehicle to redistribute risks in the
insurance market, it wipes away the risk differences in the three insurance markets
by commanding individuals to purchase private health insurance.125 As a result, each
individual will become a member of a risk pool under the requirements of the
individual mandate.126 One commentator believes that the primary purpose of
PPACA’s individual mandate is to establish private-market healthcare reform that
reflects more solidarity in the health insurance system. 127 Professor Hoffman
remarked, “[a] solidaristic [health insurance] system is one in which risks are pooled
equally and broadly among healthy and sick insureds, resulting in ‘health
redistribution,’ where the healthy help to shoulder the burden of medical care costs
for the sick.”128 Americans committed to furthering social justice in the United
States should welcome PPACA’s individual mandate as a useful instrument to
promote solidarity in the healthcare system where each of us can share the blessings
of liberty by equally and broadly dividing our risks as our brothers’ keepers. 129 Our
perception of America’s national character influences whether we view PPACA’s
individual mandate as doing the right thing130 because it helps to secure the
advantages of liberty for millions of Americans who would otherwise be unable have
access to healthcare.131 President Barack Obama urged Congress to enact healthcare
reform for the reason that it is the right thing to do for the sake of our national
conscience.132 While discussing the controversy surrounding PPACA, Professor Gina
Rosoff appropriately said, “[t]he American national character influences what we
attempt, how we go about it, and how likely we are to succeed.”133
The plan for an individual mandate within healthcare reform in America began
with Republican politicians, who had no problem with its constitutionality before
President Barack Obama, a Democrat, campaigned on the issue when he was seeking
election.134 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has expansive authority to
124
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regulate products affecting interstate commerce, as individual health insurance
coverage or the lack thereof was thought to effect commerce adequately enough to
justify regulation. 135 The established economics of health insurance reveals that an
individual mandate to acquire insurance is an essential part of regulating how health
insurers price and offer their products on the market. 136
However, federal district courts in Virginia and Florida avoided the economic
marketplace rationale for Commerce Clause regulatory scrutiny and held that
Congress did not have the constitutional authority to force individuals to buy health
insurance or pay a fee.137 Minutes after President Obama signed PPACA into law on
March 23, 2010, a legal crusade against the law began with thirteen states, led by
Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, asking federal courts across the country to
declare that Congress lacked the authority under the under the Commerce Clause
when it enacted PPACA.138 For example, Virginia Attorney General Kenneth
Cuccinelli took independent legal action in Virginia, with the state of Virginia as the
only plaintiff, on grounds comparable to those states in the Florida litigation. 139 At
the heart of the Republican-led Florida lawsuit challenging PPACA was the
constitutionality of the individual mandate. 140 It appeared that Republicans had
quickly forgotten that they were the creators of the individual mandate as a tool for
healthcare reform.141
Much of the commentary and litigation involving PPACA placed the individual
mandate as the center of attention because of the intense belief by many that the
individual mandate goes beyond the federal government’s enumerated power under
the Commerce Clause.142 Those objecting to the individual mandate maintain that
commanding all Americans to pay for privately-offered healthcare insurance is not
only unconstitutional but extraordinary and wrong. 143 Most observers predicted the
constitutional validity of PPACA’s individual mandate would eventually be decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 144 The prediction became a reality on November 14,
2011 when the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
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for the Eleventh Circuit was granted in Florida v. Department of Health and Human
Services.145
III. ON NOVEMBER 14, 2011, THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED TO HEAR A CASE FROM
FLORIDA OBJECTING TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
REVERSE THE CONCLUSION
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Department of
Health and Human Services has been considered a political and constitutional
blockbuster.146 The Court’s decision to become involved in the constitutional debate
over PPACA was anticipated, as any federal court striking down an Act of Congress
is almost certainly to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. One commentator believed
that any ruling in the Supreme Court case will be of great assistance in identifying
the constitutional standards of the Roberts court.147 Pam Bondi, Florida’s attorney
general, said she appreciated the court’s quick decision to review the 11th Circuit’s
opinion, in which Florida was the lead plaintiff. 148 Ms. Bondi said, “we have urged
swift judicial resolution because of the unprecedented threat that the individual
mandate poses to the liberty of Americans simply because they live in this
country.”149 Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, the House Democratic
leader, said an opinion from the Supreme Court approving PPACA and its individual
mandate means that, consistent with the intent of Congress, “Americans will benefit
from lower health care costs and greater access to high-quality medical care.”150
The Supreme Court’s decision to review PPACA presents an interesting public
policy question that is generating a great deal of attention in American politics. 151
Those opposed to PPACA, despite the Supreme Court eventually upholding the law,
have successfully improperly framed the debate in the context of the constitutional
limits of the government's power under the Commerce Clause. 152 But, Congress has
expansive power to regulate economic activity under the Commerce Clause as a
matter of judgment.153
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PPACA is valid under the Constitution because both the Commerce Clause and
the political process authorize Congress to regulate both the cost of and access to
healthcare.154 The political process is available to both the states and individuals as a
check on congressional power to regulate the purchase of healthcare insurance as
economic activity.155 PPACA inflames president Obama’s conservative opponents,
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause reality because the law highlights one
part of President Obama’s progressive domestic agenda.156 During the 2012
presidential election, the Republican candidates made an energetic vow to take a part
PPACA, which is now commonly coined: “Obamacare.” The Supreme Court’s
opinion also sent a clearly identifiable message to the electorate when upholding
PPACA during the 2012 presidential elections. 157
After President Obama signed PPACA, those individuals that antagonized by the
Act rushed to dispute its constitutional validity in court. 158 The initial court opinions
demonstrated an obvious pattern, with federal district court judges chosen by
Democratic presidents supporting the law and Republican appointees finding the Act
unconstitutional.159 In an Eleventh Circuit judgment, Judge Frank Hull, who was
appointed to his federal judgeship by Bill Clinton, united with a Republican judge in
holding PPACA unconstitutional, arguing that the Act was too invasive. 160 However,
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and D.C. Circuit, two well-known
Republican-selected judges agreed that, although the PPACA is invasive, the Act is
within the bounds of the powers granted to Congress under the constitution. 161
Although PPACA may appear invasive, the issue regarding the individual
mandate of the Act is more of a political issue than a serious issue regarding the
constitutional limitations on the Commerce Clause. 162 PPACA’s individual mandate
places a federal regulatory requirement on individuals to purchase health insurance
in order to promote social justice for all. Comparable regulatory requirements were
placed on privately owned restaurants to prevent them from practicing racial
discrimination by denying people the right to eat. 163 Federal regulations under the
Commerce Clause may also prohibit access to medical marijuana necessary to
relieve unbearable pain.164 As a practical matter, it is absolutely crucial that Congress
be granted the freedom and discretion to create a national solution to alleviate a
national problem, like healthcare reform, by utilizing the individual mandate.165
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The Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of PPACA’s individual mandate put forward a
thinly veiled goal to rollback the enumerated Commerce Clause power of
Congress.166 To roll back this power, the Eleventh Circuit virtually ignored Supreme
Court precedent standing for the notion that federal laws enacted by Congress are
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity. 167 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
exceeded its judicial authority when it failed to follow the Supreme Court’s
instruction to “invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.” 168 The Eleventh Circuit’s
rationale for rolling back the federal commerce power of Congress without adequate
justification, effectively concluding that Congress exceeded its enumerated authority
under the Commerce Clause demonstrates a lack of judicial restraint and respect for
the institutional role of Congress. 169
When Congress exercised its enumerated power under the Commerce Clause, its
legislative judgments, which were rationally supported and not otherwise prohibited
by the Constitution, were entitled to judicial deference. 170 By subjecting Congress’s
exercise of its enumerated commerce power to the rational basis standard of judicial
review in the current public policy debate over healthcare policy, a court
demonstrates respect for the traditional expertise of Congress involving a
commercial enterprise under a power expressly delegated to Congress by the
Constitution.171 When Congress affirmatively acts via its enumerated commerce
powers, the rational basis standard of judicial review is both necessary and proper.
Such a high level of deference is required because Congress, unlike the judicial
branch, is accountable to the people when addressing controversial subjects, like
accessibility to healthcare coverage.172
By rejecting the individual mandate, the Eleventh Circuit effectively ignored
over 75 years of precedent that granted Congress authority, under the Commerce
Clause, to regulate areas of the national economy that require a Congressional
solution.173 It is undisputable that it is an issue that an estimated 5 million people
lacked healthcare insurance coverage. 174 More troubling is that only 63% of
uninsured individuals’ healthcare costs are paid for, leaving the remaining, $43
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billion in 2008, unpaid.175 The unpaid amount is then indirectly paid for by insured
individuals through increased premiums which are invoked by health insurance
providers – an average of over $1,000 a year per family.176 The individual mandate
sought to provide a solution to this issue in the national economy, and as granted
under the Commerce Clause, Congress acted within its right to regulate. 177
In Gibbons, the Court noted that Congress held unlimited power under the
Commerce Clause, except for those expressed in the Constitution.178 With this
strong presumption of Commerce Clause precedent giving Congress wide latitude to
regulate the national economy, Congress has already regulated the insurance
industry, as observed in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, as well as
private health insurance policies, healthcare providers, and other provisions
concerning the consumption of healthcare services. 179 Regulation of healthcare
services includes the regulation of prices or price-fixing for healthcare service
expenditures in order to stimulate commerce. 180 Therefore, it has been previously
established that Congress has the authority to regulate the healthcare industry
generally and health insurance specifically. 181
Eventually, everyone is certain to participate in the healthcare market as a
consumer.182 Without PPACA’s individual mandate, an individual may easily opt out
of purchasing health insurance; however, a person may never opt out of the
healthcare services market.183 No individual can simply “opt out” of contracting an
unavoidable illnesses or having a health emergency in the future, although in rare
instances such may be the case for an individual. 184 Consequently, it is “a question
of when and how individuals will consume and pay for such services, not whether
they will consume them.”185 The Eleventh Circuit described PPACA’s individual
mandate as a constitutional grant of general police power to Congress. 186 Those who
avidly oppose PPACA, however, claim that by allowing the individual mandate,
Congress would have unlimited power under the Commerce Clause to impose far175
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reaching requirements on individuals.187 However noble and legitimate these
concerns on individual liberties may be, for the purposes of American constitutional
law, those arguments are untenable because PPACA’s individual mandate regulates
an activity that is inherently economic in nature and does not seek to regulate outside
of that narrow scope.188
Relying on Lopez and Morrison, The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress
exceeded its regulation authority under the Commerce Clause with PPACA’s
individual mandate. Both Lopez and Morrison held that Congress exceeded its
Commerce Clause regulating authority;189 however, the Eleventh Circuit majority
could not have been more incorrect in its analysis. Lopez and Morrison tackled
issues that were non-economic in nature.190 Lopez invalidated the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, which criminalized possessing a firearm in public school zones. 191 The
Act contemplated by the Supreme Court in Lopez was unrelated to commerce and
economic activity due to the lack of any legitimate connection between the action
(possessing a firearm in public schools) and the economic activity Congress sought
to control.192 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Morrison invalidated criminal
sanctions for gender-motivated felonious acts of violence, another non-economic
regulation passed by Congress.193
Contrary to the issues addressed by the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison,
regulating the cost-shifting of $43 billion by uninsured individuals in our healthcare
marketplace is economic in nature.194 The Supreme Court, if it was to rely on Lopez
and Morrison, would have to rely on an unacceptable chain of reasoning to find a
nexus between regulating criminal conduct having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.195 But, PPACA’s individual mandate has a substantial economic
connection to regulation of the healthcare marketplace and interstate commerce.
There is direct link between the individual mandate’s requirement to purchase
healthcare insurance or pay a tax penalty and the regulatory scheme of healthcare
services.196
An individual’s failure to purchase health insurance coverage and that
individual’s subsequent inability to pay for healthcare services incurred affects
commerce because those participating in the health insurance market unavoidably
will pay for those unpaid services through increased premiums. 197 Unlike Lopez and
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Morrison, PPACA’s individual mandate is a comprehensive statute essential to
regulating the economic issues underlying healthcare services and is not a regulatory
scheme invoking social interaction or criminal prohibitions. 198
Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence is unharmed, despite PPACA’s
individual mandate being upheld.199 Lopez and Morrison lack any facts concerning
economic activity within Congress’s constitutional reach to regulate. 200 The Supreme
Court in those two cases recognized this, and both statutes were invalidated as
impermissible actions of Congress. The limitations applied in those cases do not
apply to PPACA’s individual mandate, which is inherently economic in nature. 201
When Congress regulates inherently economic activity that substantially impacts the
interstate healthcare market or interstate healthcare insurance, that regulation is
entitled to a presumption of constitutional validity under a rational basis standard.202
Therefore, Congress’s conclusion that PPACA’s individual mandate is an essential
component to effectively and efficiently regulate the healthcare market or health
insurance industry is permissible under the Commerce Clause.203
The Eleventh Circuit decision invalidating PPACA disregards Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority by attempting to heighten the level of judicial scrutiny
required when reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 204 The evidence
regarding unpaid healthcare services directly attributed to the amount of uninsured
Americans reveals the need for PPACA’s individual mandate. PPACA’s regulatory
scheme concerning America’s health insurance industry meets the rational basis
scrutiny required of Congress when it acts to regulate interstate commerce. 205
Inevitably, uninsured individuals will consume healthcare services or products, and
the subsequent unpaid healthcare costs will be shifted to those individuals who
participate in the health insurance market.206 Years of judicial precedent demonstrate
Congress has broad authority to regulate the interstate marketplace, 207 and rejection
of PPACA’s individual mandate limits Congress’s presumptive rational basis
Commerce Clause authority to regulate the health insurance and healthcare
markets.208
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg’s conclusion in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius argues that the Commerce Clause
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authorizes Congress to enact the individual mandate. 209 Similar to offering elderly
and survivorship benefits in the 1930’s, offering heightened accessibility to the
healthcare marketplace in 2012 is permissible under the Commerce Clause. Plainly,
it is untenable to conclude that the PPACA violates the Commerce Clause.210 When
enacting the Social Security Act, Congress exercised its Commerce Clause authority
to establish a federal system making available monthly benefits to previous wage
earners now retired, and to their survivors.211 Unquestionably, the Commerce Clause
grants Congress the ability to approve a similar scheme in healthcare. Congress
decided, as an alternative, to preserve a pivotal role for private insurers as well as
state governments.212 “According to The Chief Justice, the Commerce Clause does
not permit that preservation. This rigid reading of the Clause makes scant sense and
is stunningly retrogressive. Since 1937, our precedent has recognized Congress' large
authority to set the Nation's course in the economic and social welfare realm.” 213
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the rationale of the majority opinion in Florida v. Department of
Health and Human Services unquestionably reveals the Lopez Commerce Clause
enumerated powers analysis was not utilized as a rubric to protect the presumptive
validity of PPACA’s individual mandate under the rational basis standard.214 The
Lopez rationale of rolling back Congress’s expansive Commerce Clause power was
misused by the majority opinion in the Eleventh Circuit. 215 The misuse of Lopez
occurred when the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted Lopez to represent the
unfounded proposition that Congress must meet a standard higher than rational basis
in order to enact PPACA’s individual mandate under the Commerce Clause. 216 The
Eleventh Circuit’s rationale for concluding that the individual mandate in PPACA is
an example of Congress exceeding its enumerated authority under the Commerce
Clause demonstrates a lack of judicial restraint and respect for the institutional role
of Congress.217 When the Eleventh Circuit attempts to roll back federal Commerce
209
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Clause power, without demonstrating that the individual mandate is not a rational
attempt to regulate activity with a substantial impact on interstate commerce, it
demonstrates judicial disrespect for Congress’s plenary power under the Commerce
Clause.218 The Supreme Court’s rigid reading of the Commerce Clause in Florida v.
Department of Health and Human Services is retrogressive and should only make
scant sense to those who wish to roll back Supreme Court precedent acknowledging
that Congress' extensive authority to regulate the Nation's agenda in the area
addressing economic and social welfare policy since 1937.219
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